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In addition to constraining bilateral exposures of financial institutions, there are essentially two
options for future financial regulation of systemic risk (SR): First, financial regulation could attempt
to reduce the financial fragility of global or domestic systemically important financial institutions
(G-SIBs or D-SIBs), as for instance proposed in Basel III. Second, future financial regulation could
attempt strengthening the financial system as a whole. This can be achieved by re-shaping the
topology of financial networks. We use an agent-based model (ABM) of a financial system and the
real economy to study and compare the consequences of these two options. By conducting three
“computer experiments” with the ABM we find that re-shaping financial networks is more effective
and efficient than reducing leverage. Capital surcharges for G-SIBs can reduce SR, but must be
larger than those specified in Basel III in order to have a measurable impact. This can cause a loss
of efficiency. Basel III capital surcharges for G-SIBs can have pro-cyclical side effects.
Keywords: Systemic Risk, Basel III, Agent-Based Modeling, Self-Organized Criticality, Network Optimiza-
tion
I. INTRODUCTION
Six years after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, millions
of households worldwide are still struggling to recover
from the aftermath of those traumatic events. The ma-
jority of losses are indirect, such as people losing homes
or jobs, and for the majority, income levels have dropped
substantially. For the economy as a whole, and for house-
holds and for public budgets, the miseries of the mar-
ket meltdown of 2007-2008 are not yet over.As a conse-
quence, a consensus for the need for new financial regu-
lation is emerging [1]. Future financial regulation should
be designed to mitigate risks within the financial system
as a whole, and should specifically address the issue of
systemic risk (SR).
SR is the risk that the financial system as a whole, or
a large fraction thereof, can no longer perform its func-
tion as a credit provider, and as a result collapses. In
a narrow sense, it is the notion of contagion or impact
from the failure of a financial institution or group of in-
stitutions on the financial system and the wider economy
[2, 3]. Generally, it emerges through one of two mecha-
nisms, either through interconnectedness or through the
synchronization of behavior of agents (fire sales, margin
calls, herding). The latter can be measured by a potential
capital shortfall during periods of synchronized behavior
where many institutions are simultaneously distressed [4–
7]. Measures for a potential capital shortfall are closely
related to the leverage of financial institutions [5, 6]. In-
terconnectedness is a consequence of the network nature
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of financial claims and liabilities [8]. Several studies in-
dicate that financial network measures could potentially
serve as early warning indicators for crises [9–11].
In addition to constraining the (potentially harmful)
bilateral exposures of financial institutions, there are es-
sentially two options for future financial regulation to
address the problem [12, 13]: First, financial regulation
could attempt to reduce the financial fragility of “super-
spreaders” or systemically important financial institu-
tions (SIFIs), i.e. limiting a potential capital shortfall.
This can achieved by reducing the leverage or increasing
the capital requirements for SIFIs. “Super-spreaders”
are institutions that are either too big, too connected or
otherwise too important to fail. However, a reduction of
leverage simultaneously reduces efficiency and can lead to
pro-cyclical effects [14–23]. Second, future financial reg-
ulation could attempt strengthening the financial system
as a whole. It has been noted that different financial net-
work topologies have different probabilities for systemic
collapse [24]. In this sense the management of SR is re-
duced to the technical problem of re-shaping the topology
of financial networks [12].
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
recommendation for future financial regulation for SIFIs
is an example of the first option. The Basel III frame-
work recognizes SIFIs and, in particular, global and do-
mestic systemically important banks (G-SIBs or D-SIBs).
The BCBS recommends increased capital requirements
for SIFIs – the so called “SIFI surcharges” [3, 25]. They
propose that SR should be measured in terms of the im-
pact that a bank’s failure can have on the global financial
system and the wider economy, rather than just the risk
that a failure could occur. Therefore they understand SR
as a global, system-wide, loss-given-default (LGD) con-
2cept, as opposed to a probability of default (PD) con-
cept. Instead of using quantitative models to estimate
SR, Basel III proposes an indicator-based approach that
includes the size of banks, their interconnectedness, and
other quantitative and qualitative aspects of systemic im-
portance.
There is not much literature on the problem of dy-
namically re-shaping network topology so that networks
adapt over time to function optimally in terms of sta-
bility and efficiency. A major problem in NW-based SR
management is to provide agents with incentives to re-
arrange their local contracts so that global (system-wide)
SR is reduced. Recently, it has been noted empirically
that individual transactions in the interbank market al-
ter the SR in the total financial system in a measurable
way [26, 27]. This allows an estimation of the marginal
SR associated with financial transactions, a fact that has
been used to propose a tax on systemically relevant trans-
actions [26]. It was demonstrated with an agent-based
model (ABM) that such a tax – the systemic risk tax
(SRT) – is leading to a dynamical re-structuring of finan-
cial networks, so that overall SR is substantially reduced
[26].
In this paper we study and compare the consequences
of two different options for the regulation of SR with an
ABM. As an example for the first option we study Basel
III with capital surcharges for G-SIBs and compare it
with an example for the second option – the SRT that
leads to a self-organized re-structuring of financial net-
works. A number of ABMs have been used recently to
study interactions between the financial system and the
real economy, focusing on destabilizing feedback loops be-
tween the two sectors [26, 28–33]. We study the different
options for the regulation of SR within the framework of
the CRISIS macro-financial model1. In this ABM, we im-
plement both the Basel III indicator-based measurement
approach, and the increased capital requirements for G-
SIBs. We compare both to an implementation of the
SRT developed in [26]. We conduct three “computer ex-
periments” with the different regulation schemes. First,
we investigate which of the two options to regulate SR is
superior. Second, we study the effect of increased capital
requirements, the “surcharges”, on G-SIBs and the real
economy. Third, we clarify to what extend the Basel III
indicator-based measurement approach really quantifies
SR, as indented by the BCBS.
1 http://www.crisis-economics.eu
II. BASEL III INDICATOR-BASED
MEASUREMENT APPROACH AND CAPITAL
SURCHARGES FOR G-SIBS
A. Basel III indicator-based measurement
approach
The Basel III indicator-based measurement approach
consists of five broad categories: size, interconnectedness,
lack of readily available substitutes or financial institu-
tion infrastructure, global (cross-jurisdictional) activity
and “complexity”. As shown in table I, the measure
gives equal weight to each of the five categories. Each
category may again contain individual indicators, which
are equally weighted within the category. Here below we
describe each of the categories in more detail.
Cross-jurisdiction activity: This indicator captures
the global “footprint” of Banks. The motivation
is to reflect the coordination difficulty associated
with the resolution of international spillover effects.
It measures the bank’s cross-jurisdictional activity
relative to other banks activities. Here it differen-
tiates between (i) cross-jurisdictional claims, and
(ii) cross-jurisdictional liabilities.
Size: This indicator reflects the idea that size matters.
Larger banks are more difficult to replace and the
failure of a large bank is more likely to damage con-
fidence in the system. The indicator is a measure
of the normalized total exposure used in Basel III
leverage ratio.
Interconnectedness: A bank’s systemic impact is
likely to be related to its interconnectedness to
other institutions via a network of contractual obli-
gations. The indicator differentiates between (i) in-
degree on the network of contracts (ii) out-degree
on the network of contracts, and (iii) outstanding
securities.
Substitutability/financial institution infrastructure:
The indicator for this category captures the in-
creased difficulty in replacing banks that provide
unique services or infrastructure. The indicator
differentiates between (i) assets under custody
(ii) payment activity, and (iii) underwritten
transactions in debt and equity markets.
Complexity: Banks are complex in terms of business
structure and operational “complexity”. The costs
for resolving a complex bank is considered to be
greater. This is reflected in the indicator as
(i) notional amount of over-the-counter derivatives
(ii) level 3 assets, and (iii) trading and available-
for-sale securities.
The score Sj of the Basel III indicator-based measure-
ment approach for each bank j and each indicator Di,
e.g. cross-jurisdictional claims, is calculated as the frac-
tion of the individual banks with respect to all B Banks
3Category (and weighting) Individual indicator Indicator weighting
Cross-jurisdictional activity (20%) Cross-jurisdictional claims 10%
Cross-jurisdictional liabilities 10%
Size (20%) Total exposures as defined for use in the Basel III
leverage ratio
20%
Interconnectedness (20%) Intra-financial system assets 6.67%
Intra-financial system liabilities 6.67%
Securities outstanding 6.67%
Substitutability/financial institu-
tion infrastructure (20%)
Assets under custody 6.67%
Payments activity 6.67%
Underwritten transactions in debt and equity
markets
6.67%
Complexity (20%) Notional amount of over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives
6.67%
Level 3 assets 6.67%
Trading and available-for-sale securities 6.67%
TABLE I. Basel III indicators and indicator weights for the “indicator-based measurement approach”.
and then weighted by the indicator weight (βi). The
score is given in basis points (factor 10000)
Sj =
∑
i∈I
βi
Dij∑B
j D
i
j
10000 , (1)
where I is the set of indicators Di and βi the weights
from table I.
B. Basel III capital surcharges for G-SIBs
In the Basel III “bucketing approach”, based on the
scores from eq. (1), banks are divided into four equally
sized classes (buckets) of systemic importance, seen here
in table II. The cutoff score and bucket thresholds have
been calibrated by the BCBS in such a way that the
magnitude of the higher loss absorbency requirements
for the highest populated bucket is 2.5% of risk-weighted
assets, with an initially empty bucket of 3.5% of risk-
weighted assets. The loss absorbency requirements for
the lowest bucket is 1% of risk-weighted assets. The loss
absorbency requirement is to be met with common equity
[3]. Bucket five will initially be empty. As soon as the
bucket becomes populated, a new bucket will be added
in such a way that it is equal in size (scores) to each
of the other populated buckets and the minimum higher
loss absorbency requirement is increased by 1% of risk-
weighted assets.
III. THE MODEL TO TEST THE EFFICIENCY
OF SR REGULATION
We use an ABM, linking the financial and the real
economy. The model consists of banks, firms and house-
holds. One pillar of the model is a well-studied macroeco-
nomic model [34–36], the second pillar is an implementa-
tion of an interbank market. In particular, we extend the
model used in [26] with an implementation of the Basel
III indicator-based measurement approach and capital
surcharges for SIBs. For a comprehensive description of
the model, see [26, 36, 37].
The agents in the model interact on four different mar-
kets. (i) Firms and banks interact on the credit market,
generating flows of loan (re)payments. (ii) Banks inter-
act with other banks on the interbank market, gener-
ating flows of interbank loan (re)payments. (iii) House-
holds and firms interact on the labour market, generating
flows wage payments. (iv) Households and firms interact
on the consumption-goods market, generating flows of
goods. Banks hold all of firms and households? cash as
deposits. Households are randomly assigned as owners of
firms and banks (share-holders).
Agents repeat the following sequence of decisions at
each time step: 1. firms define labour and capital de-
mand, 2. banks rise liquidity for loans, 3. firms allo-
cate capital for production (labour), 4. households re-
ceive wages, decide on consumption and savings, 5. firms
and banks pay dividends, firms with negative cash go
bankrupt, 6. banks and firms repay loans, 7. illiq-
uid banks try to rise liquidity, and if unsuccessful, go
bankrupt. Households which own firms or banks use div-
idends as income, all other households use wages. Banks
and firms pay 20% of their profits as dividends. The
agents are described in more detail below.
1. Households
There are H households in the model. Households can
either be workers or investors that own firms or banks.
Each household j has a personal account Aj,b(t) at one
of the B banks, where index j represents the household
and index b the bank. Workers apply for jobs at the F
different firms. If hired, they receive a fixed wage w per
4Bucket Score range Bucket thresholds Higher loss absorbency requirement (com-
mon equity as a percentage of risk-
weighted assets)
5 D-E 530-629 3.50%
4 C-D 430-529 2.50%
3 B-C 330-429 2.00%
2 A-B 230-329 1.50%
1 Cutoff point-A 130-229 1.00%
TABLE II. Categorization of systemic importance in the “bucketing approach”, as proposed by the BCBS.
time step, and supply a fixed labour productivity α. A
household spends a fixed percentage c of its current ac-
count on the consumption goods market. They compare
prices of goods from z randomly chosen firms and buy
the cheapest.
2. Firms
There are F firms in the model. They produce per-
fectly substitutable goods. At each time step firm i com-
putes its own expected demand di(t) and price pi(t). The
estimation is based on a rule that takes into account both
excess demand/supply and the deviation of the price
pi(t− 1) from the average price in the previous time step
[36]. Each firm computes the required labour to meet the
expected demand. If the wages for the respective work-
force exceed the firm’s current liquidity, the firm applies
for a loan. Firms approach n randomly chosen banks and
choose the loan with the most favorable rate. If this rate
exceeds a threshold rate rmax, the firm only asks for φ
percent of the originally desired loan volume. Based on
the outcome of this loan request, firms re-evaluate the
necessary workforce, and hire or fire accordingly. Firms
sell the produced goods on the consumption goods mar-
ket. Firms go bankrupt if they run into negative liquidity.
Each of the bankrupted firms’ debtors (banks) incurs a
capital loss in proportion to their investment in loans to
the company. Firm owners of bankrupted firms are per-
sonally liable. Their account is divided by the debtors
pro rata. They immediately (next time step) start a new
company, which initially has zero equity. Their initial
estimates for demand di(t) and price pi(t) is set to the
respective averages in the goods market.
3. Banks
The model involves B banks. Banks offer firm loans
at rates that take into account the individual specificity
of banks (modeled by a uniformly distributed random
variable), and the firms’ creditworthiness. Firms pay a
credit risk premium according to their creditworthiness
that is modeled by a monotonically increasing function
of their financial fragility [36]. Banks try to grant these
requests for firm loans, providing they have enough liq-
uid resources. If they do not have enough cash, they
approach other banks in the interbank market to obtain
the necessary amount. If a bank does not have enough
cash and can not raise the total amount requested on the
interbank market, it does not pay out the loan. Interbank
and firm loans have the same duration. Additional refi-
nancing costs of banks remain with the firms. Each time
step firms and banks repay τ percent of their outstanding
debt (principal plus interest). If banks have excess liq-
uidity they offer it on the interbank market for a nominal
interest rate. The interbank relation network is modeled
as a fully connected network and banks choose the inter-
bank offer with the most favorable rate. Interbank rates
rij(t) offered by bank i to bank j take into account the
specificity of bank i, and the creditworthiness of bank
j. If a firm goes bankrupt the respective creditor bank
writes off the respective outstanding loans as defaulted
credits. If the bank does not have enough equity capital
to cover these losses it defaults. Following a bank de-
fault an iterative default-event unfolds for all interbank
creditors. This may trigger a cascade of bank defaults.
For simplicity’s sake, we assume a recovery rate set to
zero for interbank loans. This assumption is reasonable
in practice for short term liquidity [38]. A cascade of
bankruptcies happens within one time step. After the
last bankruptcy is resolved the simulation is stopped.
A. Implementation of the Basel III indicator-based
measurement approach
In the ABM, we implement the size indicator by cal-
culating the total exposures of banks. Total exposure
includes all assets of banks excluding cash, i.e. loans to
firms and loans to other banks. Interconnectedness is
measured in the model by interbank assets (loans) and
interbank liabilities (deposits) of banks. As a measure
for substitutability we use the payment activity of banks.
The payment activity is measured by the sum of all out-
going payments by banks. In the model we do not have
cross-jurisdictional activity and banks are not engaged
in selling complex financial products including deriva-
tives and level 3 assets. We therefore set the weights
for global (cross-jurisdictional) activity and complexity
to zero.
Banks in the model have to observe loss absorbency
5(capital) requirements according to Basel III. They are
required to hold 4.5% of common equity (up from 2%
in Basel II) of risk-weighted assets (RWAs). RWAs are
calculated according to the standardized approach, i.e.
with fixed weights for all asset classes. As fixed weights
we use 100% for interbank loans and commercial loans.
We define equity capital of banks in the model as common
equity.
In the model banks are allocated to the five buckets
shown in table II based on the scores obtained by eq. (1).
Banks have to meet additional loss absorbency require-
ments as shown in table II. The score is calculated at
every time step t and capital requirements must be ob-
served before providing new loans.
B. Implementation of the SRT in the model
The SRT is implemented in the model as described in
[26], for details see section VIC and [26]. The SRT is cal-
culated according to eq. (12) and is imposed on all inter-
bank transactions. All other transactions are exempted
from SRT. Before entering a desired loan contraction,
loan requesting bank i obtains quotes for the SRT rates
from the Central Bank, for various potential lenders j.
Bank i chooses the interbank offer from bank j with the
smallest total rate. The SRT is collected into a bailout
fund.
IV. RESULTS
Below we present the results of three experiments. The
first experiment focuses on the performance of different
options for regulation of SR, the second experiment on
the consequences of different capital surcharges for G-
SIBs, and the third experiment on the effects of differ-
ent weight distributions for the Basel III indicator-based
measurement approach.
A. Performance of different options for regulation
of SR
In order to understand the effects of Basel III capital
surcharges for G-SIBs on the financial system and the real
economy, and to compare it with the SRT, we conduct
an experiment where we consider three cases: (i) finan-
cial system regulated with Basel II, (ii) financial system
regulated with Basel III, with capital surcharges for G-
SIBs, (iii) financial system with the SRT. With Basel II
we require banks to hold 2% of common equity of their
RWAs. RWAs are calculated according to the standard-
ized approach.
The effects of the different regulation policies on total
losses to banks L (see section VIE) are shown in fig. 1(a).
Clearly, with Basel II (red) fat tails in the loss distribu-
tions of the banking sector are visible. Basel III with
capital surcharges for G-SIBs slightly reduces the losses
(almost not visible). The SRT gets almost completely
rid of big losses in the system (green). This reduction
in major losses in the financial system is due to the fact
that with the SRT the possibility of cascading failure is
drastically reduced. This is shown in fig. 1(b) where the
distributions of cascade sizes S (see section VIE) for the
three modes are compared. With the Basel regulation
policies we observe cascade sizes of up to 20 banks, while
with the SRT the possibility of cascading failure is dras-
tically reduced. Clearly, the total transaction volume
V (see section VIE) in the interbank market is not af-
fected by the different regulation policies. This is seen in
fig. 1(c), where we show the distributions of transaction
volumes.
In fig. 1(d) we show the SR-profile of the financial sys-
tem given by the rank-ordered DebtRanks Ri of all banks
[27]. The SR-profile shows the distribution of systemic
impact across banks in the financial system. The bank
with the highest systemic impact is to the very left. Ob-
viously, the SRT drastically reduces the systemic impact
of individual banks and leads to a more homogeneous
spreading of SR across banks. Basel III with capital sur-
charges for G-SIBs sees a slight reduction in the systemic
impact of individual banks.
B. Consequences of different capital surcharges for
G-SIBs
Next, we study the effect of different levels of capital
surcharges for G-SIBs. Here we consider three differ-
ent settings: (i) capital surcharges for G-SIBs as speci-
fied in Basel III (table II), (ii) double capital surcharges
for G-SIBs, (iii) threefold capital surcharges for G-SIBs.
With larger capital surcharges for G-SIBs, we observe a
stronger effect of the Basel III regulation policy on the
financial system. Clearly, the shape of the distribution of
losses L is similar (fig. 2(a)). The tail of the distributions
is only reduced due to a decrease in efficiency (transac-
tion volume), as is seen in fig. 2(c). Evidently, average
losses L are reduced at the cost of a loss of efficiency by
roughly the same factor. This means that Basel III must
reduce efficiency in order to show any effect in terms of
SR, see section V.
In fig. 2(d) we show the SR-profile for different capital
surcharges for G-SIBs. Clearly, the systemic impact of
individual banks is also reduced at the cost of a loss of
efficiency by roughly the same factor.
In fig. 2(b) we show the cascade size of synchronized
firm defaults. Here we see an increase in cascading failure
of firms with increasing capital surcharges for G-SIBs.
This means larger capital surcharges for G-SIBs can have
pro-cyclical side effects, see section V.
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FIG. 1. Comparison of different options for regulation of systemic risk: Basel II without mitigation of systemic risk (red), Basel
III with capital surcharges for G-SIBs (blue), and the systemic risk tax (green). (a) Distribution of total losses to banks L, (b)
distribution of cascade sizes C of defaulting banks, (c) distribution of total transaction volume in the interbank market V, and
(d) the risk profile for systemic risk given by the distribution of DebtRanks Ri (banks are ordered by Ri, the most systemically
important being to the very left). Basel III with capital surcharges for G-SIBs only slightly reduces cascading failure (barely
visible), while the systemic risk tax almost gets completely rid of big losses in the system. Efficiency (credit volume) is not
affected by the different regulation policies.
C. Does the Basel III indicator-based
measurement approach measure SR?
Finally, we study the effects of different weight dis-
tributions for the Basel III indicator-based measurement
approach. In particular, we are interested in whether it
is more effective to have capital surcharges for “super-
spreaders” or for “super-vulnerable” financial institu-
tions. A vulnerable financial institution in this context is
an institution that is particularly exposed to failures in
the financial system, i.e. has large credit or counterparty
risk (CR). Holding assets is generally associated with the
risk of losing the value of an investment. Whereas a li-
ability is an obligation towards a counterparty that can
have an impact if not fulfilled. To define an indicator
that reflects SR and identifies “super-spreaders” we set
the weight on intra-financial system liabilities to 100%.
For an indicator that reflects CR of interbank assets and
identifies vulnerable financial institutions of we set the
weight on intra-financial system assets to 100%. Weights
on all other individual indicators are set to zero. Specif-
ically, we consider three different weight distributions.
(i) weights as specified in Basel III (table I), (ii) indicator
weight on interbank liabilities set to 100%, (iii) indicator
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FIG. 2. Comparison of different levels of capital surcharges for G-SIBs: surcharge x1 (blue), surcharge x2 (red), and surcharge
x3 (yellow). (a) Distribution of total losses to banks L, (b) distribution of cascade sizes of synchronized firm defaults, (c)
distribution of total transaction volume in the interbank market V, and (d) the risk profile for systemic risk given by the
distribution of DebtRanks Ri (banks are ordered by Ri, the most systemically important being to the very left). With larger
capital surcharges for G-SIBs, Basel III capital surcharges have a more visible effect on the financial system. Average losses L
are reduced at the cost of a loss of efficiency by roughly the same factor.
weight on interbank assets set to 100%.
To illustrate the effects of different weight distribu-
tions, we once again use larger capital surcharges for G-
SIBs, as specified in Basel III. To allow a comparison be-
tween the different weight distributions, we set the level
of capital surcharges for each weight distribution to result
in a similar level of efficiency (credit volume). Specifi-
cally, for the weight distribution as specified in Basel III
(table I) we multiply the capital surcharges for G-SIBs
as specified in Basel III (table II) by a factor 2.75, for
indicator weight on interbank liabilities by 3 and for in-
dicator weight on interbank assets by 4.5. In fig. 3(b) we
show that efficiency, as measured by transaction volume
in the interbank market, is indeed similar for all weight
distributions.
In fig. 3(a) we show the losses to banks L for the
different weight distributions. Clearly, imposing capi-
tal surcharges on “super-spreaders” (yellow) does indeed
reduce the tail of the distribution, but does not, how-
ever, get completely rid of large losses in the system (yel-
low). In contrast, imposing capital surcharges on “super-
vulnerable” financial institutions (red) shifts the mode of
the loss distribution without reducing the tail, thus mak-
ing medium losses more likely without getting rid of large
losses.
To illustrate the effect of the different weight distri-
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FIG. 3. Comparison of different weight distributions for the individual indicators: weights as specified in Basel III (blue),
indicator weight on interbank assets (red) and indicator weight on interbank liabilities (yellow). (a) Distribution of total losses
to banks L, (b) distribution of cascade sizes C of defaulting banks, (c) the risk profile for systemic risk given by the distribution
of DebtRanks Ri (banks are ordered by Ri, the most systemically important being to the very left), and (d) the risk profile for
credit risk shows the distribution of the average vulnerability of banks (section VID).
butions, we show the risk profiles for SR and CR. Risk
profiles for SR show the systemic impact as given by the
DebtRank Ri (banks are ordered by Ri, the most sys-
temically important being to the very left). Risk profiles
for CR show the distribution of average vulnerability, i.e.
a measure for CR in a financial network, for details see
section VID. The corresponding SR- and CR-profiles are
shown for the different weight distributions in fig. 3(c)
and fig. 3(d). Imposing capital surcharges on “super-
spreaders” leads to a more homogeneous spreading of SR
across all agents, as shown in fig. 3(c) (yellow). Whereas
capital surcharges for “super-vulnerable” financial insti-
tutions leads to a more homogeneous spreading of CR
(fig. 3(d) (red)). Interestingly, homogeneous spreading of
CR (SR) leads to a more unevenly distributed SR (CR),
as seen by comparing fig. 3(c) and fig. 3(d).
V. DISCUSSION
We use an ABM to study and compare the conse-
quences of the two different options for the regulation
of SR. In particular we compare financial regulation that
attempts to reduce the financial fragility of SIFIs (Basel
III capital surcharges for G-SIBs) with a regulation policy
that aims directly at reshaping the topology of financial
networks (SRT).
SR emerges in the ABM through two mechanisms, ei-
ther through interconnectedness of the financial system
9or through synchronization of the behavior of agents.
Cascading failure of banks in the ABM can be explained
as follows. Triggered by a default of a firm on a loan, a
bank may suffer losses exceeding its absorbance capacity.
The bank fails and due to its exposure on the interbank
market, other banks may fail as well. Cascading failure
can be seen in fig. 1(b).
Basel III capital surcharges for G-SIBs work in the
ABM as follows. Demand for commercial loans from
firms depends mainly on the expected demand for goods.
Firms approach different banks for loan requests. If
banks have different capital requirements, banks with
lower capital requirements may have a higher leverage
and provide more loans. Effectively, different capital re-
quirement produce inhomogeneous leverage levels in the
banking system. Imposing capital surcharges for G-SIBs
means that banks with a potentially large impact on oth-
ers must have sizable capital buffers. With capital sur-
charges for G-SIBs, non-important banks can use higher
leverage until they become systemically important them-
selves. This leads to a more homogenous spreading of SR,
albeit that reduction and mitigation of SR is achieved
“indirectly”.
The SRT leads to a self-organized reduction of SR in
the following way [26]: Banks looking for credit will try
to avoid this tax by looking for credit opportunities that
do not increase SR and are thus tax-free. As a result,
the financial network rearranges itself toward a topology
that, in combination with the financial conditions of in-
dividual institutions, will lead to a new topology where
cascading failures can no longer occur. The reduction and
mitigation of SR is achieved “directly” by re-shaping the
network.
From the experiments we conclude that Basel III cap-
ital surcharges for G-SIBs reduce and mitigate SR at the
cost of a loss of efficiency of the financial system (fig. 2(a)
and fig. 2(c)). This is because overall leverage is reduced
by capital surcharges. On the other hand, the SRT keeps
the efficiency comparable to the unregulated financial
system. However it avoids cascades due to the emergent
network structure. This means – potentially much higher
– capital requirements for “super-spreaders” do address
SR but at the cost of efficiency.
SR through synchronization emerges in the ABM in
the following way: Similarly to the root cause of cascad-
ing failure in the banking system, an initial shock from
losses from commercial loans can lead to a synchroniza-
tion of firm defaults. If banks are able to absorb ini-
tial losses, the losses still result in an implicit increase in
leverage. In order to meet capital requirements (Basel
III), the bank needs to reduce the volume of commercial
loans. This creates a feedback effect of firms suffering
from reduced liquidity, which in turn increases the proba-
bility of defaults and closes the cycle. This feedback effect
is inherent to the system and can be re-inforced by Basel
III capital surcharges for G-SIBs. In the experiments we
see that this feedback effect gets more pronounced with
larger capital surcharges for G-SIBs (fig. 2(b)). Here we
see an increase in cascading failure of firms with increas-
ing capital surcharges for G-SIBs. This means capital
surcharges for G-SIBs can have pro-cyclical side effects.
Basel III measures systemic importance with an
indicator-based measurement approach. The indicator
approach is based on several individual indicators con-
sisting of banks’ assets and liabilities. By studying the
effect of different weight distributions for the individual
indicators, we find that Basel III capital surcharges for
G-SIBs are more effective with higher weights on liabil-
ities (fig. 3(a)). This means – quite intuitively – that
asset-based indicators are more suitable for controlling
credit risk and liability based indicators are more suit-
able for controlling systemic risk. Since the indicators
in the Basel proposal are predominantly based on assets,
the Basel III indicator-based measurement approach cap-
tures predominantly credit risk and therefore does not
meet it’s declared objective.
To conclude with a summary at a very high level, the
policy implications obtained with the ABM are (i) re-
shaping financial networks is more effective and efficient
than reducing leverage, (ii) capital surcharges for G-SIBs
(“super-spreaders”) can reduce SR, (iii) but must be
larger than specified in Basel III to have an measurable
impact, (iv) and thus cause a loss of efficiency. (v) Basel
III capital surcharges for G-SIBs can have pro-cyclical
side effects.
VI. METHODS
A. DebtRank
DebtRank is a recursive method suggested in Battiston
et al. [39] to determine the systemic relevance of nodes in
financial networks. It is a number measuring the fraction
of the total economic value in the network that is poten-
tially affected by a node or a set of nodes. Lij denotes the
interbank liability network at any given moment (loans
of bank j to bank i), and Ci is the capital of bank i. If
bank i defaults and cannot repay its loans, bank j loses
the loans Lij . If j does not have enough capital available
to cover the loss, j also defaults. The impact of bank i
on bank j (in case of a default of i) is therefore defined
as
Wij = min
[
1,
Lij
Cj
]
. (2)
The value of the impact of bank i on its neighbors is
Ii =
∑
j Wijvj . The impact is measured by the economic
value vi of bank i. For the economic value we use two
different proxies. Given the total outstanding interbank
exposures of bank i, Li =
∑
j Lji, its economic value is
defined as
vi = Li/
∑
j
Lj . (3)
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To take into account the impact of nodes at distance
two and higher, this has to be computed recursively.
If the network Wij contains cycles, the impact can ex-
ceed one. To avoid this problem an alternative was sug-
gested in Battiston et al. [39], where two state variables,
hi(t) and si(t), are assigned to each node. hi is a con-
tinuous variable between zero and one; si is a discrete
state variable for three possible states, undistressed, dis-
tressed, and inactive, si ∈ {U,D, I}. The initial condi-
tions are hi(1) = Ψ , ∀i ∈ S; hi(1) = 0 , ∀i 6∈ S, and
si(1) = D , ∀i ∈ S; si(1) = U , ∀i 6∈ S (parameter Ψ
quantifies the initial level of distress: Ψ ∈ [0, 1], with
Ψ = 1 meaning default). The dynamics of hi is then
specified by
hi(t) = min

1, hi(t− 1) + ∑
j|sj(t−1)=D
Wjihj(t− 1)

 .
(4)
The sum extends over these j, for which sj(t− 1) = D,
si(t) =


D if hi(t) > 0; si(t− 1) 6= I,
I if si(t− 1) = D,
si(t− 1) otherwise .
(5)
The DebtRank of the set S (set of nodes in distress at
time 1), is R′S =
∑
j hj(T )vj−
∑
j hj(1)vj , and measures
the distress in the system, excluding the initial distress.
If S is a single node, the DebtRank measures its systemic
impact on the network. The DebtRank of S containing
only the single node i is
R′i =
∑
j
hj(T )vj − hi(1)vi . (6)
The DebtRank, as defined in eq. (6), excludes the loss
generated directly by the default of the node itself and
measures only the impact on the rest of the system
through default contagion. For some purposes, however,
it is useful to include the direct loss of a default of i
as well. The total loss caused by the set of nodes S in
distress at time 1, including the initial distress is
RS =
∑
j
hj(T )vj . (7)
B. Expected systemic loss
The precise meaning of the DebtRank allows us to de-
fine the expected systemic loss for the entire economy
[26, 27]. Assuming that we have B banks in the system,
the expected systemic loss can be approximated by
ELsyst(t) = V (t)
B∑
i=1
pi(t)Ri(t) , (8)
with pi(t) the probability of default of node i, and V (t)
the combined economic value of all nodes at time t. For
details and the derivation, see [27].
To calculate the marginal contributions to the ex-
pected systemic loss, we start by defining the net liability
network Lnetij (t) = max[0, Lij(t)−Lji(t)]. After we add a
specific liability Lmn(t), we denote the liability network
by
L
(+mn)
ij (t) = L
net
ij (t) +
∑
m,n
δimδjnLmn(t) , (9)
where δij is the Kronecker symbol. The marginal con-
tribution of the specific liability Lmn(t) on the expected
systemic loss is
∆(+mn)ELsyst(t) =
=
B∑
i=1
pi(t)
(
V (+mn)(t)R
(+mn)
i (t)− V (t)Ri(t)
)
,
(10)
where R
(+mn)
i (t) = Ri(L
(+mn)
ij (t), Ci(t)) is the DebtRank
of the liability network and V (+mn)(t) the total economic
value with the added liability Lmn(t). Clearly, a positive
∆(+mn)ELsyst(t) means that Lmn(t) increases the total
SR.
Finally, the marginal contribution of a single loan (or
a transaction leading to that loan) can be calculated. We
denote a loan of bank i to bank j by lijk. The liability
network changes to
L
(+k)
ij (t) = L
net
ij (t) +
∑
m,n,k
δimδjnδkklmnk(t) . (11)
Since i and j can have a number of loans at a given time
t, the index k numbers a specific loan between i and j.
The marginal contribution of a single loan (transaction)
∆(+k)ELsyst(t), is obtained by substituting L
(+mn)
ij (t) by
L
(+k)
ij (t) in eq. (10). In this way every existing loan in the
financial system, as well as every hypothetical one, can
be evaluated with respect to its marginal contribution to
overall SR.
C. Systemic risk tax
The central idea of the SRT is to tax every transaction
between any two counterparties that increases SR in the
system [26]. The size of the tax is proportional to the
increase of the expected systemic loss that this transac-
tion adds to the system as seen at time t. The SRT for a
transaction lijk(t) between two banks i and j is given by
SRT
(+k)
ij (t) =
= ζmax
[
0,
∑
i
pi(t)
(
V (+k)(t)R
(+k)
i (t)− V (t)Ri(t)
)]
.
(12)
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ζ is a proportionality constant that specifies how much
of the generated expected systemic loss is taxed. ζ = 1
means that 100% of the expected systemic loss will be
charged. ζ < 1 means that only a fraction of the true SR
increase is added on to the tax due from the institution
responsible. For details, see [26].
D. Average vulnerability
Using DebtRank we can also define an average vulner-
ability of a node in the liability network Lij [40]. Re-
call that hi(T ) is the state variable, which describes the
health of a node in terms of equity capital after T time
steps (si ∈ {U, I}, i.e. all nodes are either undistressed
or inactive). When calculating hi(T ) for Sf containing
only a single node i, we can define hij(T ) as the health
of bank j in case of default of bank i
hij(T ) =
[
h1(T ) . . . hN (T )
]
. (13)
Note that is necessary to simulate the default of every
single node of the liability network Lij separately to ob-
tain hij . With hij we can define the average vulnerability
of a node in the liability network as the average impact
of other nodes on node i
Vi =
1
B
∑
j
hji , (14)
where B is the number of nodes in the liability network
Lij .
E. Measures for losses, default cascades and
transaction volume
We use the following three observables: (1) the size of
the cascade, C as the number of defaulting banks trig-
gered by an initial bank default (1 ≤ C ≤ B), (2) the
total losses to banks following a default or cascade of
defaults, L =
∑
i∈I
∑B
j=1 Lij(t), where I is the set of de-
faulting banks, and (3) the average transaction volume
in the interbank market in simulation runs longer than
100 time steps,
V =
1
T
T∑
t=1
B∑
j=1
B∑
i=1
∑
k∈K
ljik(t) , (15)
where K represents new interbank loans at time step t.
[1] D. Aikman, A. G. Haldane, and S. Kapadia. Opera-
tionalising a macroprudential regime: Goals, tools and
open issues. Financial Stability Journal of the Bank of
Spain, 24, 2013.
[2] Olivier De Bandt and Philipp Hartmann. Systemic risk:
A survey. Technical report, CEPR Discussion Papers,
2000.
[3] Bank for International Settlements. Basel III: A global
regulatory framework for more resilient banks and bank-
ing systems. Bank for International Settlements, 2010.
[4] Tobias Adrian and Markus Brunnermeier. Covar. Techni-
cal report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011.
[5] Viral Acharya, Lasse Pedersen, Thomas Philippon, and
Matthew Richardson. Measuring systemic risk. Techni-
cal report, CEPR Discussion Papers, 2012. Available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1573171.
[6] Christian T Brownlees and Robert F Engle. Volatil-
ity, correlation and tails for systemic risk measurement.
Available at SSRN 1611229, 2012.
[7] Xin Huang, Hao Zhou, and Haibin Zhu. Systemic risk
contributions. Journal of financial services research, 42
(1-2):55–83, 2012.
[8] Larry Eisenberg and Thomas H. Noe. Systemic risk in
financial systems. Management Science, 47(2):236–249,
2001.
[9] J. Caballero. Banking crises and financial integration.
IDB Working Paper Series No. IDB-WP-364, 2012.
[10] Monica Billio, Mila Getmansky, Andrew W Lo, and Lo-
riana Pelizzon. Econometric measures of connectedness
and systemic risk in the finance and insurance sectors.
Journal of Financial Economics, 104(3):535–559, 2012.
[11] Camelia Minoiu, Chanhyun Kang, V. S. Subrahmanian,
and Anamaria Berea. Does financial connectedness pre-
dict crises? Technical Report 13/267, International Mon-
etary Fund, Dec 2013.
[12] Andrew G. Haldane and Robert M. May. Systemic risk
in banking ecosystems. Nature, 469(7330):351–355, 01
2011.
[13] Sheri Markose, Simone Giansante, and Ali Rais
Shaghaghi. ‘Too interconnected to fail’ financial network
of US CDS market: Topological fragility and systemic
risk. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83
(3):627–646, 2012.
[14] Hyman P. Minsky. The financial instability hypothesis.
The Jerome Levy Economics Institute Working Paper,
74, 1992.
[15] Ana Fostel and John Geanakoplos. Leverage cycles and
the anxious economy. American Economic Review, 98
(4):1211–44, 2008.
[16] John Geanakoplos. The leverage cycle. In D. Acemoglu,
K. Rogoff, and M. Woodford, editors, NBER Macro-
economics Annual 2009, volume 24, page 165. University
of Chicago Press, 2010.
[17] Tobias Adrian and Hyun S. Shin. Liquidity and leverage.
Tech. Rep. 328, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2008.
[18] Markus Brunnermeier and Lasse Pedersen. Market liq-
uidity and funding liquidity. Review of Financial Studies,
22(6):2201–2238, 2009.
[19] S. Thurner, J.D. Farmer, and J. Geanakoplos. Lever-
age causes fat tails and clustered volatility. Quantitative
Finance, 12(5):695–707, 2012.
12
[20] Fabio Caccioli, Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, and J. Doyne
Farmer. Impact-adjusted valuation and the criticality
of leverage. in review, http://arxiv.org/abs/1204.0922,
2012.
[21] Sebastian Poledna, Stefan Thurner, J. Doyne Farmer,
and John Geanakoplos. Leverage-induced systemic risk
under Basle II and other credit risk policies. Journal of
Banking & Finance, 42:199–212, 2014.
[22] Christoph Aymanns and Doyne Farmer. The dynamics
of the leverage cycle. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 50:155–179, 2015.
[23] Fabio Caccioli, J Doyne Farmer, Nick Foti, and Daniel
Rockmore. Overlapping portfolios, contagion, and finan-
cial stability. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Con-
trol, 51:50–63, 2015.
[24] Tarik Roukny, Hugues Bersini, Hugues Pirotte, Guido
Caldarelli, and Stefano Battiston. Default cascades in
complex networks: Topology and systemic risk. Scientific
Reports, 3(2759), 2013.
[25] Co-Pierre Georg. Basel III and systemic risk regulation -
what way forward? Technical Report 17, Working Papers
on Global Financial Markets, 2011.
[26] Sebastian Poledna and Stefan Thurner. Elimination of
systemic risk in financial networks by means of a systemic
risk transaction tax. in review, 2014.
[27] Sebastian Poledna, Jose´ Luis Molina-Borboa, Seraf´ın
Mart´ınez-Jaramillo, Marco van der Leij, and Stefan
Thurner. The multi-layer network nature of systemic risk
and its implications for the costs of financial crises. Jour-
nal of Financial Stability, 20:70–81, 2015.
[28] Domenico Delli Gatti, Mauro Gallegati, Bruce C Green-
wald, Alberto Russo, and Joseph E Stiglitz. Business
fluctuations and bankruptcy avalanches in an evolving
network economy. Journal of Economic Interaction and
Coordination, 4(2):195–212, 2009.
[29] Stefano Battiston, Domenico Delli Gatti, Mauro Galle-
gati, Bruce Greenwald, and Joseph E Stiglitz. Liaisons
dangereuses: Increasing connectivity, risk sharing, and
systemic risk. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Con-
trol, 36(8):1121–1141, 2012.
[30] Gabriele Tedeschi, Amin Mazloumian, Mauro Gallegati,
and Dirk Helbing. Bankruptcy cascades in interbank
markets. PloS one, 7(12):e52749, 2012.
[31] Giampaolo Gabbi, Giulia Iori, Saqib Jafarey, and James
Porter. Financial regulations and bank credit to the real
economy. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
50:117–143, 2015.
[32] Stefan Thurner and Sebastian Poledna. Debtrank-
transparency: Controlling systemic risk in financial net-
works. Scientific reports, 3(1888), 2013.
[33] P. Klimek, S. Poledna, J.D. Farmer, and S. Thurner.
To bail-out or to bail-in? answers from an agent-based
model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 50:
144–154, 2015.
[34] Edoardo Gaffeo, Domenico Delli Gatti, Saul Desiderio,
and Mauro Gallegati. Adaptive microfoundations for
emergent macroeconomics. Eastern Economic Journal,
34(4):441–463, 2008.
[35] D. Delli Gatti, E. Gaffeo, M. Gallegati, G. Giulioni, and
A. Palestrini. Emergent Macroeconomics: An Agent-
Based Approach to Business Fluctuations. New economic
windows. Springer, 2008. ISBN 9788847007253.
[36] Domenico Delli Gatti, Saul Desiderio, Edoardo Gaffeo,
Pasquale Cirillo, and Mauro Gallegati. Macroeconomics
from the Bottom-up. Springer Milan, 2011.
[37] Stanislao Gualdi, Marco Tarzia, Francesco Zamponi, and
Jean-Philippe Bouchaud. Tipping points in macroeco-
nomic agent-based models. Journal of Economic Dynam-
ics and Control, 50:29–61, 2015.
[38] Rama Cont, Amal Moussa, and Edson Santos. Network
structure and systemic risk in banking systems. In Jean-
Pierre Fouque and Joseph A Langsam, editors, Handbook
of Systemic Risk, pages 327–368. Cambridge University
Press, 2013.
[39] Stefano Battiston, Michelangelo Puliga, Rahul Kaushik,
Paolo Tasca, and Guido Caldarelli. Debtrank: Too cen-
tral to fail? financial networks, the FED and systemic
risk. Scientific reports, 2(541), 2012.
[40] Hideaki Aoyama, Stefano Battiston, and Yoshi Fujiwara.
DebtRank Analysis of the Japanese Credit Network. Dis-
cussion papers 13087, Research Institute of Economy,
Trade and Industry (RIETI), October 2013.
